The time-stamp in my title-which refers to a plausible dramatic date for Plato's
Classicists are usually inclined, when considering the paths ahead for criticism, to have a look at the paths behind, and of the many ancient texts that that talk about criticism one seems to have special pertinence to our situation: the Protagoras also seems to have been written to take stock at the end of a great generation of critics, the so-called "sophists" of classical Greece. Although Plato's immediate readers would have lived in the 380's, he recreates a conversation Socrates had with Greece's most famous intellectuals about a generation earlier, in the heyday of Periclean Athens. In the course of this richly imagined drama-a sort of novella of ideas-the value of studying poetry comes up as a topic of discussion and is then pursued through a sustained close explication of a famous old lyric. For critics of the present time, the interest of Plato's long, shifting discussion ultimately fails to answer the philosophic questions it raises-whether virtue is teachable and whether it is a form knowledge. But near its middle Protagoras affords us an extended example, really the only thing of its kind in ancient Greek literature, of how poetry was analyzed by the most sophisticated critics of the classical age. This precious evidence has naturally been much studied, 4 but it has proved very hard to judge what point Plato is making here. One the one hand, it seems serious: one can recognize in the exegeses many of the assumptions and methods that still guide contemporary academic reading, as Glenn Most has shown; on the other, there are some wild, explicitly unserious claims blended in, and it is not clear if we are to regard even Socrates' contribution as any better than the rest. The episode ends by declaring itself a waste of time: Socrates says it is not worth discussing poetry when the poets are not at hand to be questioned about what they meant. Criticism, apparently, ought to aim at eliciting the poet's intent in composing the poem, and in the absence of direct testimony on this topic criticism of poetry becomes a form of social-climbing:
"Conversing (dialegesthai) about poetry seems to me like the dinner parties of low and vulgar people who borrow the voices of poets because they are too ill-educated to converse properly with one another." 5 True gentlemen "have no need to employ the extraneous voices of poets, whom it is not possible to interrogate about what they say.
When people bring them up, some say that the poet means this and others that, and the point in dispute can never be decided." 6 Socrates recommends that the company decline this common sort of entertainment and put one another to the proof in conversation. 7 The excessiveness of Socrates' assumption that only a poem's author knows its meaning and the fruitlessness of the discussion as a whole are among the reasons why the passage has been dismissed as a sort of joke. 8 But this is unsatisfactory, for it leaves us without any sense of why Plato should have prolonged this episode to fill nearly a fifth of the work (338E-347C). 9 Because Plato's point and purpose are so obscure, the Protagoras is usually neglected or at best given tangential mention in histories of Greek criticism (my own included). 10 In my view a main reason for this is a larger problem with the scholarship on Plato's views of poetry, and this is that it is lopsidedly obsessed with metaphysics, putting too much stress on some arguments about mimêsis in Republic 10 to the exclusion of Plato's manifold other observations-some admiring, some neutralabout poetry and its uses. The usual view, which might be called the "ancient quarrel" approach, makes Plato's main concern in discussing poetry to deny its truth and value;
any allusion to verse is analyzed as far as possible in terms of poetic ignorance, imitation, and deception so as to fit the passage into an extended and relentless war Plato is thought to have waged against poetry. But the Socrates of Protagoras is far from being an implacable enemy of poets: he is a well-educated, up-to-date and urbane consumer of having Socrates "break" the frame of his narrative and refer again to "fair" Alcibiades (316B). In reading from this point until the criticism scene begins at 338E, it is helpful to bracket the specific arguments raised and notice the variety of discursive modes that are on display. This part of Protagoras is a sustained experiment in the best way to conduct a discussion. 19 The participants try out a number of modes of speech, explicitly debating "in what fashion are we to talk together." 20 The discussion shifts and halts and almost breaks down as ground-rules have to be set and then re-negotiated, with straw ballots taken and umpires nominated. The argument of Protagoras does not advance very far in this section, but its focus on modes of argumentation will help us see the literary discussion as yet another genre of discourse, a rule-bound language game whose purpose 17 312D: C §*(+)9)60 ) Ë * (7+"( &'(0Ú0 .°#'(0; Cf. Ion 531A where deinos describes the expertise of Ion, a professional performer and explainer of Homeric poetry. 18 We find out later (341A-B) that Socrates has learned from Prodicus that deinos should properly mean "bad":
19 For which the operative word is dialegesthai, suggesting the ideal form of conversation is dialectic.
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we will try to divine.
The importance of choosing the right mode of speech comes out as soon as the pilgrims meet Protagoras. Upon being introduced, Protagoras asks whether they wish to converse with him alone or in company. 21 Socrates leaves the choice up to him, but lets him know that Hippocrates aims to study with him to become a man of account in the city. 22 Protagoras thanks Socrates for being considerate: 23 a foreign professor recruiting the sons of Athenian citizens is in a delicate position and has to be sure not to be thought to be seducing young men. He then goes into a speech (316C-317C) justifying his profession with the argument that sophists, experts in improving men, have been around for a very long time; this is a paradoxical thesis, since "sophist" was a neologism coined to name the new forms of higher education that Protagoras and his like promoted in the post-Persian War cultural boom. 24 Protagoras contends that early wise men were really sophists but, because controversy attended the title, pretended to exercise other arts:
Homer, Hesiod and Simonides pretended to be poets; Orpheus and Musaeus to communicate religious lore and oracles; among the acknowledged teachers of the present day, Herodicus, expert in gymnastics, and Agathocles the musician are closet sophists since they improve men. Protagoras only differs from them in admitting he is a sophist, a professional educator, for he has concluded that he will not deceive the wise by hiding his teaching under another name. By this brilliant, ironic and charming fiction, Protagoras paradoxically represents his modern teaching as venerable tradition, and simultaneously insinuates to potential pupils that sophists are only rightly appreciated by the wise.
The semantics of the word are studied in A. Ford, "Sophistic," Common Knowledge 1.5 (1993) 33-47.
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Being the open sort that he is, Protagoras proposes to hold their discussion before questions reveal that they disagree as to whether human excellence (aretê, traditionally translated "virtue") can be taught. Socrates holds it cannot for two reasons: the way democratic Athens runs her deliberative assemblies implies that expertise in politics is not the province of any particular group of people; secondly, when noble parents have wastrel children one sees excellence cannot be taught. He thus politely prevails on the sophist to be so kind as to "demonstrate" or "display" (epideiknumi) his wisdom on this matter. 29 Now the epideixis, the elaborate, often mythical or paradoxical display speech, was the main show piece of many a sophist, and Protagoras is such a master of the form that he can offer Socrates a choice of modes: "I consent, but first: shall I give my display in the form of a story (muthos), as an old man speaks to younger men, or shall I go
(. Note that "those within" who get to listen in on this speech are "those without," the readers, a typical instance of the ironies of this text. 26 )" )' @% &2!ƒ !"‹ )" IJ**2K §0&'2:"+/"( !"‹ !"..,*2+"+/"( ˜)( §%"+)"‹ "È) Ë 43(#µ°0 ( '‰µ'0. 27 317D: +10°&%( 0 !")"+!'19+,µ'0, L0" !"/'MÒµ'0 ( &(".°#6+/'. The word +10°&%( 0, literally a "sitting together" (the source, via Aramaic, of the Jewish Sanhedrin) appears both of formal and informal meetings in 4 th -century Greek. 28 318D: GÊ )' !".«- §%,)D-, ¶36, OE G5!%")'-, !"‹ §#= ) ›-!".«- §%,)«+( ;"2%, 4* !%(0Òµ'0 -. Hippias also stood for questions from the crowd (000). Cf. Gorgias in Gorg. 448A: "I haven't had a new question put to me in many years." 29 320B:
through the argument (logos) in detail?" 30 The company leave this up to Protagoras, and he chooses to tell a myth because he finds it more "agreeable" or "graceful."
31 Protagoras' capriciousness is meant to suggest that he could do either, and he ends up doing both: his great myth of how Prometheus and Epimetheus distributed political wisdom to everyone equally (320D-323C) explains that Athens is right to run assemblies as she does, and so answers Socrates' first argument: this he affirms (323C-324D) constitutes a sufficient "demonstration" that virtue is teachable. 32 Then with further signposting he turns "from myth to logos" 33 to explain why excellent people do not always raise excellent children. This logos is an inference from observed facts, for the lessons and punishments that are dispensed in schools and in the laws imply that children can learn to be good. The display comes to a close with Protagoras' explicit declaration that he has answered both of Socrates' doubts through both myth and logos.
34
The cumulative effect is literally stunning to Socrates who confesses that he is now persuaded that there may be some human way of contriving to become good. 35 Alas, there's a little rub, 36 and to pursue this Socrates begs to change the mode of discussion:
he asks Protagoras not to make a long speech, as he's shown he can do so well, but to
engage in the sophistic trick of "brief-talk" (brakhulogia). 37 In the short-answer mode
Socrates quickly leads Protagoras down the garden path. His gross equivocations (e.g.
'justice must itself be just,' 330C ff.) make Protagoras contradict himself, and Socrates presses his advantage by cutting down Protagoras' rhetorical options still further when asks him not to take refuge in answers qualified by "if" (331C-D). Protagoras' temper soon begin to fray (332A) and his continually increasing irritation (333B, cf. 333D1) erupts in an applause-winning short speech to the effect that all Socrates' terms are relative (333E).
Things threaten to fall apart: Socrates repeats his request that Protagoras practice brachylogy (334E) 38 since long-speaking strains his feeble comprehension; Protagoras, being an avowed expert in both styles, should accommodate him. 39 Protagoras, for his part, refuses to abandon long speeches (335A); he didn't get to be Greece's champion debater by letting others set the terms. Socrates declares he has an errand to go on (335C) for he wants a dialogical conversation and not "demagogic" long speeches. 40 As he is about to leave, the others intervene and broker an agreement to let the "conversation"
(dialegesthai) go on. 41 Here we reach another section-marker in the dialogue, nodding
Socrates begins his attempt to supplant sophistic discourse with dialectic by derogating long speeches: "If a man were to go and consult Pericles or any of our great public orators about these matters, he might perhaps hear as fine a discourse; but then when one has a question to ask of any of them, like books, they can neither answer nor ask; and if any one challenges the least particular of their speech, they go ringing on in a long harangue, like brazen pots, which when they are struck continue to sound unless some one puts his hand upon them" (329A). 
44
Socrates peri epôn deinos (342D)
So it is that when the reins are given him Protagoras modulates the discussion into poetic interpretation. He makes clear that he considers this to be a continuation of the previous conversation about virtue but now "transferred onto poetry." 45 "The most important part of education," he asserts, "is being clever concerning verse (peri epôn deinos); that is, to understand what is said by the poets, both well and ill, to be able to tell the difference and to give an account when challenged" (339A). 46 Unlike his previous sophistic performances, this game seems specifically Protagorean, and it is based on the special knowledge he sloganized as "correct verbal expression" or orthoepeia. 47 It is a game played by nominating a phrase of poetry as good or bad and then being able to defend that judgment when challenged.
Protagoras illustrates by quoting the beginning of a song by Simonides: "Now for a man to become good truly is hard, /four-square in hands, and feet and mind, faultlessly 44 Eliot would have sympathized; cf. "Function of Criticism" (1933) p. 13-14: "we perceive that criticism, far from being a simple and orderly field of beneficent activity, from which impostors can readily be ejected, is no better than a Sunday park of contending and contentious orators, who have not even arrived at the articulation of their differences. fashioned." 48 Socrates knows the song, indeed he "happens" to have made a study of it, 49 and readily agrees with Protagoras that it is "well made and correct." 50 Protagoras then goes on to show that Simonides contradicts himself "as the song goes along" (*% ÛÒ0) -) Ë Z+µ") -, 339C): "Nor does that saying of Pittacus ring true to me, / though wise was the one who said it: 'to be noble is hard.'" 51 Simonides cannot both lay it down as a maxim 52 in his own person that it is hard to be good (*%«) 0 "È)Ú-Í*°/') ;".'*Ú0 '‰0"( B0&%" 4#"/Ú0 #'0°+/"() and "a little while later" (339D)
deny Pittacus' maxim that it is hard to be noble or good (;".'*Ú0 §+/.Ú0 ¶µµ'0"().
Protagoras finishes this display of "correct verbal-expression" with a flourish, drawing applause from the crowd. But it is hard to see what point he has scored in the debate about virtue, apart from pulling a rug from under Socrates. Perhaps it is simply to have shown that he is very clever, cleverer than Socrates and even than Simonides, whom he had enrolled along with Homer and Hesiod among his predecessors as teachers of excellence (316D).
To buy time Socrates turns to Prodicus, declaring that sophist's knowledge of 48 Simonides 542.1-2 PMG: B0&%' 4#"/Ú0 µ¢0 4."/°,-#'0°+/"( ;".'*Ò0, / ;'%+20 )' !"‹ * +‹ !"‹ 0Òƒ )')%9#,0 0, B0'1 [Ò# 1 )')1#µ°0 0. 49 §*2+)"µ"2 )' #9%, !"‹ *901 µ ( )1#;90'( µ'µ'.6!Ú-) Ë Z+µ") -. In making Socrates' knowledge of the song a matter of chance Plato indicates that it was not a widely cited "chestnut" that 'everyone' could be expected to know (pace Ledbetter's "well known," p. 99). On Simonides' fading reputation at this time, see Ford (2002) 000 with references. 50 339B: !".«-+ ( & !'› *'* (7+/"( !"‹ Ù%/«-. 51 542.12-13 PMG : È&° µ ( §µµ'.°,-)Ú @())9!'( 0 0°µ')"(, / !"2) ( + 3 Ë *"%$ 3,)Ú-'?%6µ°0 0: ;".'*Ú0 39)' §+/.Ú0 / ¶µµ'0"(. 52 On genre, the choice of verb 339D ("È)Ú-Í*°/') ) has a discursive coloration, showing Protagoras takes Simonides to be moralizing, in the vein of such works as the Kheironos hupothêkai. Cf. 340C-D: §0 µ¢0 ) ›-*%5) (-"È)Ú-ı G(µ,02&6-)Ø0 •"1) Ë #05µ60 4*'3AE0") , ˜)( B0&%" 4#"/Ú0 4.6/'2K #'0°+/"( ;".'*Ú0 ' ‡6. Bergk III 385-6 on Sim. Fr. 5 took it as parainetic poem, intended to free Scopas from blame for some great crime he had done, though the ancients probably classed it under Epinician; Blass assigned it to the genre skolion; similarly Most, with great probability, sees it as a sympotic lyric. Aristotle refers to the poem at Met. 1.2. Ar. Eq. 405 shows that a Simonidean line "Drink, drink at the turn of events" (= Sim. 14 Bk) was sung as a skolion in the 420's, at least by the knightly class.
verbal distinctions to be an "ancient and divine" art, one that began with Simonides or yet earlier (341A). They propose to reconcile the statements by distinguishing between the verb "be," used by Pittacus, and Simonides' "become": Simonides is right, for to "become" good is hard; so too is Pittacus, for "being" good is not hard. 53 In this way they reconcile the two sentences and bring them into conformity with traditional wisdom.
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Protagoras retorts that this position entails the unacceptable claim that virtue is easy to possess when all agree that it is the most difficult thing (340E). "Great would be the poet's ignorance" if this were his thought. Socrates and Prodicus accept this and turn to a different word, Pittacus' "hard" (khalepon). They suggest that in the Cean dialect khalepon meant "bad," and so Cean Simonides was shocked to hear (Lesbian) Pittacus saying "it is bad to be good." Protagoras is completely unimpressed and dismisses the attempt, noting that it is ruled out by Simonides' following verse which says "god along were actually very devoted to philosophy but practiced it in secret to hide the fact that their military success really derived from their wisdom rather than arms. Sparta's secret philosophical education produced "Laconic" philosophers, simple-appearing men and women who could yet let fall the briefest but pithiest utterances. 57 Indeed, it was from the Spartans that the Seven Sages learned those "short and memorable pronouncements" that are now repeated as proverbs. 58 And the only reason that this hermetic tradition leaked out was that one time the sages decided to make a thanksgiving offering to Apollo by inscribing a number of "brachylogistic laconisms" on the temple of Delphi, such as in orthoepeia) was an affectation. The word was current in Ionic for "words" or "language" generally, but in Attic had been largely ousted by logos and was confined to poetic or other specialized expressions. It is natural that the exquisite sensitiveness to language that Protagoras claimed should be expressed in uncommon diction. We differ in that she thinks Socrates' forced readings show that he is still parodying "sophistic interpretation" (a monolithic notion, a straw-man that I think is a fabrication); whereas I think he is doing as well as he can with such an intractable thing as a poem with no author present. of discourse been exhausted: after Socrates performs, Hippias offers a speech (logos) on Simonides he is eager to give (347B), and of course there is the dialectical exchange that fills the second half of the work.
Among these discursive forms, Pittacus' maxim and the "Laconic" Delphic inscriptions symbolize in condensed form the problems posed to moderns by the verbalized wisdom of the past. Moral philosophy needs some form of literary criticism because, as the case of Simonides shows, those seeking to distinguish themselves are confronted by provocative pieces of language preserved from the past and making moral claims that demand explication. Now Simonides' ode is of course hardly laconic, but just as Pittacus' pronouncement posed a challenge for one ambitious to make an name for wisdom, Simonides' own exposition in reply becomes, for Socrates and company, another problematic speech from the past to be wrestled with. Those like Protagoras who claim to be able to control the poetic tradition, Plato suggests, will be confronted by provocative, not fully self-explanatory pieces of language, whether in the form of Simonides' lyric or the adages of sages, and will have to make the best sense of these memorable remnants they can. For those in this situation, which is our own of course with regard to Protagoras, Socrates makes a serious proposal for a practical criticism:
confronted with such texts, we should try to find a sense in which they can be meaningful and true; if no such sense is available, we conclude that whoever their authors may be they were not wise. How soon we give up depends on our view of the source. When the saying comes from an oracle, of course, piety forecloses the option of saying the source is mistaken and we try a new meaning. An example of this way of dealing with enigmatic pronouncements is given in the Apology where Socrates went to great lengths to with cautious or ironic reverence for Simonides, "that wise and godlike man" (331E), he confesses "though you may know what he means I don't." All one can say is that if a poetic text suggests an immoral or impossible meaning then whoever said it is not wise (335E-336A).
So when Socrates takes essentially this approach in Protagoras, we should allow him to be quite serious. This appears even in one of his more questionable interpretations.
When he comes to Simonides' "I praise and love all who do nothing wrong willingly," 65 Socrates proposes to detach "unwillingly" from "do" and take it "in hyperbaton" with the more distant verb "praise." The resultant interpretation nicely brings Simonides into conformity with the Socratic principle that no one does wrong willingly: "All who do no wrong I willingly praise and love." Now one can describe this as "forced" and even "a blatant perversion of the plain sense of the poem." 66 But bending the grammar to eliminate an unacceptable meaning is a conscious choice, as Socrates admits:
Simonides was not so ill-educated as to say that he praised whoever willingly never did wrong, as if there were people who did wrong willingly. I am fairly sure of this-that none of the wise men considers that anybody ever willingly errs or
willingly does base and evil deeds; they are well aware that all who do base and evil things do them unwillingly. 67 Socrates is often content, in the Republic and elsewhere, to remain uncommitted about what poets mean and to turn away from exegesis to dialectic. 68 But in Protagoras, having been involved in this poem and its "wise" author's discussion of excellence, he decides to press for a sense in which Simonides' words can yield a meaning that is wise. by traditional wisdom. However, in the absence of having Simonides at hand to submit to dialectic, Socrates can only offer his interpretation as something of which he is "fairly sure." The ineliminable uncertainty of any attempt to interpret such "authorless" moral pronouncements from the past is the reason Socrates ends the discussion by urging that they drop talking about poetry and declare their own views directly.
The discussion of Simonides in Protagoras, then, is not a pastiche meant to ridicule attempts to find wisdom in poetry, as the "ancient quarrel" perspective suggests.
Nor is it an attack on technical or "sophistic" approaches to poetry, as if they presented a unified front: Protagoras' "cleverness about verse" differs from Prodicus' semantics, and both would doubtless differ from Hippias if the latter were given permission to perform.
If we drop the demand that this dialogue add another brick to that imaginary edifice criticism not only has certain inevitable limits, but also that certain texts, nevertheless, make criticism necessary, make it necessary for us to adopt the best form of criticism we can to deal with them. Beside these principles, there are two canons of evidence:
1. parallelism: a hypothesis' plausibility is increased by adducing parallels (linguistic and other) to problematic elements in the text. Buttressing an interpretation with parallels is especially important when studying cultures that are dead or otherwise difficult of access.
2. centripetality: the explanatory power of parallels increases the closer it gets to the text itself. Short of exact iteration, parallels are ranked, with parallels in works by the same author and in the same genre ranked above, e.g., parallels from a different culture or in a different art form.
It is worth repeating that Most tenders these merely as the disciplinary rules of philology, not as the method that produces certain interpretation (e.g. 134). In these terms, I find his analysis acute, both as a description of how philology interprets old texts (my own exposition of Plato accords with these principles) and as a general account of how we discourse as professionals and how we evaluate the discourse of our colleagues. Sometimes the text may be less important than the contexts against which it is set" (147).
My reading of Protagoras suggests that we may give another twist to Most's deconstructive thesis: contexts may be at times more important than texts in interpretation, but the best context will tend to resemble the original text very closely. If interpretation is a search for the most plausible context in which to construe a puzzling phrase, the methodical evaluation of possible contexts drives the critic ever more closely back to the very words she had supposedly departed from when she went out in search of contexts. To use Most's categories: Parallels have more force the more they resemble the words they are meant to explain, and centripetality make us prefer parallels that recall the poet's exact phrasing. Economy of expense urges interpretations to add the fewest extraneous words possible to the text that is being interpreted, and economy of consumption makes the optimal reading of a text tend toward recalling all its words.
Finally, economy of scope situates the target text within a series of larger contexts, such as the author's corpus and the literary tradition, in the middle of which it sits like a sun in a solar system: the contexts-other texts-that are adduced orbit around the original, reflecting it ever more faintly the further away they are. 72 Most persuasively argues that the poem is about poetic praise, not the nature of excellence; it concerns what is "praiseworthy" more than what is virtuous.
When we interpret in the methodical way Most recommends (without, to be sure, promising that it infallibly leads to truth), the function of criticism appears to be less to give the most objective and well-founded account possible of a poem than to serve as a mnemonic for it: the supporting context or "evidence" is a picture or story we make up to hold all the parts of the original in an intelligible relation; it motivates their presence and determines their placement. The demand that a good interpretation recall the poem may help us understand why literary critics might adopt such principles in the first place.
Most's use of the economic metaphor suggests that we thereby get a maximum of poetic meaning for a minimum expenditure of effort (e.g. 134). But I think it remains unclear why should we be economical in this sphere. Why not be a big spender in poetry? Why not be profligate and let interpretation spiral outside the narrow confines of centripetal criticism?
One possible reason for adopting the principle of economy is that it is the best way we have to bring the interpretation of poetry closer to the prestige enjoyed by the sciences: constantly reverting to the target poem is like going back to the data set and seeing if it supports a finding. This would be in line with what I consider to be the broadest and deepest ambition of criticism since the 19 th century, to put the human sciences on a par with the natural sciences. There are many reasons that we may want to think of criticism as a branch of science, a discipline that produces a sort of knowledge appropriate to its peculiar objects. My reading of Protagoras suggests another benefit of methodical hermeneutics: one of the functions of criticism is to respond to something uncanny about these tenacious little texts, something that makes them memorable and keeps them flashing into view. Plato shows us criticism as such a practice in which Most's principles and canons combine to make the "best" interpretation that which most closely calls back the details of the text, and calls back most of the details.
Thus Plato may be telling us to regard criticism rather as a social activity, an unending practice of pedagogy and literary culture. So defined, criticism aims not at truthful interpretation but at regulating the discussion of poetry, and regulating it in such a way that it reproduces the poems it must always fail to fully comprehend. An interpretation in theory provides us with a clearer and more exact account of a poem, but functionally it is a metonymy for the work: we evaluate interpretations only by recalling those words whose unintelligibility caused us to move beyond them in the first place. The more methodical the interpretation, the more the target poem will be called back to view. Now, I do not wish to conclude with the naïve and fruitless battle cry, "Back to the Texts!" It has been hard to accept Arnold's definition of the task of the critic as "to see the object as it really is" ever since Wilde called on "The Critic as Artist" to "see the object as in itself it really is not." Nor would I issue a call Against Interpretation, to replace sterile theorizing with some more rewarding experience of the text. (I confess, however, that, after a heavy dose of theory-reading I feel sympathetic with Sontag's declaration: "Our task is not to find the maximum amount of content in a work of art, much less to squeeze more content out of the work than is already there. Our task is to cut back content so that we can see the thing at all ." 73 ) What I offer is the suggestion that we, also at the end of a great age of criticism, may find it useful to bear in mind that one function criticism always seems to be serving is to be a way of recalling, repeating, and 73 "The aim of all commentary on art now should be to make works of art-and by analogy, our own experience-more rather than less, real to us." Susan Sontag, Against Interpretation (1964).
preserving a poet's words. 74 Theorized and methodized, criticism can serve as a sort of re-performance of the work, a reprise of the song in a condensed form that those equipped with critical tools can unpack. Permeating a discipline, critical language serve as a mnemonic of even a vast original, whether in global interpretations of individual critics or piecemeal among a collectivity of specialists. The point is not in either case that that any work be recollected in its entirety or finally understood, for there is an advantage in interpretation's remaining only a metonymy, in not being the text itself. It allows the work to enter certain contexts (such as journals, classrooms, conversations) where it will be not simply a reminder of the text but the fullest possible performance of that text in that context. Criticism is the reperformance of art.
Plato's Protagoras, then, is not dedicated to bashing poets or parodying literary intellectuals; it models how wise men might make meaning out of pieces of language that have survived to them. The one thing interpretation infallibly achieves is to hold such texts together and re-circulate them in company. Protagoras also proves, indirectly, that criticism can in itself preserve a poem that would otherwise be forgotten. Simonides text, like his good man, aspired to solid endurance, to be "four-squared" like a marble statue.
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But it was Plato who made Simonides' poem last, delivering most of it, along with his own Protagoras, to us. I find an un-parodic reading of Protagoras more useful in thinking about the function of criticism and one that gives us a better sense of Plato's 74 This is literally true of Simonides' Ode to Scopas: for we would not have a word of that poem if Socrates had not chosen to comment on it: our text of Plato is the sole vehicle by which that song survived to later times. 75 On the Pythagorean overtones on divinity of being "fashioned four-square," see the remarks of Svenbro (1984) 135: "Like Pindar, Simonides considered poetry superior to marble; the perfection of the foursquare man resides thus, rather than in his marmoreal virtue, in the perenniality suggested, but not realized, in sculpture. Only in the atemporal dimension of poetry does man join eternal perfection."
